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Abstract 
Complex regulatory decisions about risk rely on the brokering of evidence between 
providers and recipients, and involve personality and power relationships that influence the 
confidence that recipients may place in the sufficiency of evidence and, therefore, the 
decision outcome.  We explore these relationships in an agent-based model; drawing on 
concepts from environmental risk science, decision psychology and computer simulation.  A 
two-agent model that accounts for the sufficiency of evidence is applied to decisions about 
salt intake, animal carcass disposal and radioactive waste.  A dynamic version of the model 
assigned personality traits to agents, to explore their receptivity to evidence.  Agents with 
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‘aggressor’ personality sets were most able to imbue fellow agents with enhanced receptivity 
(with ‘avoider’ personality sets less so) and clear confidence in the sufficiency of evidence.  
In a dynamic version of the model, when both recipient and provider were assigned the 
‘aggressor’ personality set, this resulted in 10 successful evidence submissions in 71 days, 
compared with 96 days when both agents were assigned the ‘avoider’ personality set.  These 
insights suggest implications for improving the efficiency and quality of regulatory decision 
making by understanding the role of personality and power. 
 
Keywords: risk, agents, regulation, power, personality, model 
 
1. Introduction 
Complex regulatory decisions on risk rely on the provision, scrutiny and acceptance of 
scientific evidence.  Davies et al. (2010) explain how evidence is brokered (received, 
processed and passed on) between actors - a regulatee and regulator for example - in order to 
assess the significance of risks and inform decisions on how they should be managed (Oxera, 
2000).  As evidence is exchanged between organisations and promoted through a decision 
hierarchy towards the ultimate decision maker, intermediate recipients judge the sufficiency 
of evidence for those aspects of the decision they are accountable for.  Only when deemed 
sufficient is evidence passed on to others for a similar interrogation.  In regulatory settings, 
the recipients of evidence may also hold and exercise power over the provider with respect to 
its sufficiency.  As a contribution to the smarter regulation debate (Better Regulation 
Commission, 2006; Gouldson et al., 2009; Hutter, 2005; Taylor et al., 2012; 2013) we are 
interested in how regulatory confidence in risk-informed decisions is instilled as evidence is 
brokered between parties.  We suggest that agent-based tools may help researchers explore 
relationships between evidence, personality and power (Davies et al., 2010).  Here, we 
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describe a research tool for this purpose and test its applicability in the complex environment 
of regulatory decision-making using three case studies. 
Agent-based modelling simulates the relationships between actors participating in 
complex decisions (Courdier et al., 2002; Chaturvedi et al., 2000; Kurahashi and Terano, 
2005).  It has been used in the environmental sciences to explore negotiations on groundwater 
management (Feuillette at al., 2003), the effectiveness of greenbelt allocation in periurban 
settings (Brown et al., 2004), forest management strategies (Nute et al., 2004) and pine beetle 
infestation (Perez and Dragicevic, 2010).  By combining knowledge about choice, so-called 
‘automated decision makers’ can partially represent human interactions by accounting for the 
behaviours and makeup of actors.  Using these tools, scholars have modelled the influence of 
personality (a factor of individual difference; Alavizadeh et al., 2008; Canuto et al., 2005; 
Ghasem-Aghaee and Ören, 2007; Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008, 2009) and power (a factor 
of the interactions between individuals; Cincotti and Guerci et al., 2005; Marreiros et al., 
2008; Prada and Paiva, 2009) on decision making. 
Applications that explore how agents broker scientific evidence between one another 
are limited (Chen et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2010).  Scholars have, however, simulated the 
effectiveness of trading agents (Haddawy et al., 2004), investigating the effectiveness of 
auctions (Bohte et al., 2001; Mizuta and Steiglitz, 2000; Mizuta and Yamagata, 2001), buyer 
coalition schemes (Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001) and trade brokering (Alkemade et al., 
2003).  Agents mimic brokering by representing an exchange of information between parties 
to a decision.  In models of financial trade, analogous here to the exchange of evidence, 
agents are the buyers and sellers of a commodity.  Successful trades demonstrate small 
fluctuations over time.  In regulatory decision-making, a recipient of evidence (usually the 
regulator) who gives positive feedback to the provider of evidence (the regulatee, operator) 
might increase the provider’s understanding of what is expected of a regulatory submission 
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(e.g. an environmental safety case).  This may mean fewer fluctuations in the recipient’s view 
about the sufficiency of the evidence submitted, with a possibility for smoother regulatory 
approvals as an outcome for both parties – a successful ‘trade’ of evidence and increased 
confidence on behalf of the recipient.  Conceptualising the role of receptivity about 
knowledge is not new.  Both knowledge creation and transfer are dependent on transparency 
and receptivity (Larsson et al., 1998), some claiming these as key to building trust (McCole, 
2002), to effective communication (Tsali et al., 2008) and as determinants of inter-partner 
learning (Hamel, 1991).  In short, establishing interpersonal relations through receptivity and 
transparency encourages the free flow of information (Tsai et al., 2008). 
Bringing the features of real-world regulatory decisions on risk, personality and power 
together within an agent-based model is challenging and we are cautious about claims to 
reproduce the complexities of multi-agent decisions.  Arthur (1998) comments on the reality 
of economics via-à-vis our attempts to model the flows and interactions between agents: 
 “[…] the economy itself emerges from our subjective beliefs.  These 
subjective beliefs, taken in aggregate, structure the micro economy.  They 
give rise to the character of financial markets.  They direct flows of capital 
and govern strategic behaviour and negotiations.  They are the DNA of the 
economy.  These subjective beliefs are a-priori or deductively indeterminate 
in advance.  They co-evolve, arise, decay, change, mutually reinforce, and 
mutually negate.  Subject and object cannot be neatly separated.  And so the 
economy shows behaviour that we can best describe as organic, rather than 
mechanistic.  It is not a well-ordered, gigantic machine.  It is organic.  At all 
levels it contains pockets of indeterminacy.  It emerges from subjectivity and 
falls back into subjectivity.” 
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Modestly, we are concerned with whether relationships between evidence, people 
(personality) and power (structures) can be represented in an agent-based model to 
examine regulatory decisions: (i) can we construct such a model?; (ii) can it 
represent power structures and information flows?; (iii) can we represent the 
influence of personality traits and decision context on decision outcome?  We 
explore these questions in a two-agent model incorporating the prior art on power 
(French and Raven, 1959) and personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) alongside 
expert knowledge captured from case study interviews. 
 
2.  Methods and model development 
A proof of concept model was designed by reference to three case studies from Davies 
et al. (2010).  The flow of evidence between parties to these decisions (regulatees, their 
professional advisors, regulators and their advisors, the final decision-maker) was mapped 
according to Oxera (2000).  A two-agent model was then designed to represent the receptivity 
of recipients (the regulator) to the evidence submitted by a provider (the regulatee, or 
operator).  Having tested its functionality, a dynamic version of the model was attempted, 
accounting for receptivity between parties and, by inference, the degree of recipient 
confidence in the evidence brokered to inform risk decisions. 
 
2.1  Scoping study –  characterising the brokering of evidence 
Prior to model design, open-ended interviews (n=5) were conducted with regulators to 
obtain generalised insights on the brokering of evidence in regulatory decision-making.  The 
researcher (GJD) assured confidentiality before recording interviews, asking respondents to 
explain their expert role and the brokering process.  Interviews revealed the real-life 
complexities that characterise the flow of information within decisions, which are not 
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represented in decision diagrams or risk frameworks.  Field notes and interviews were 
transcribed and used to support development of lengthier semi-structured interviews and the 
agent-based model described below. 
 
2.2  Case study selection and decision routes 
The research utilised three of six candidate case studies.  These three were chosen 
because they reflected a range of conditions for the brokering of evidence (Table 1) and 
provided access to willing participants: (1) the regulatory review of a post-closure safety case 
for low-level nuclear waste disposal (denoted NW; an environmental permitting decision); 
(2) the disposal of avian influenza infected animal carcasses (AI; a planning decision under 
emergency conditions) and (3)  the proposal to reduce levels of dietary salt intake (SI; a 
policy development decision). 
Evidence in the NW case study passes through a well-defined decision framework and 
embodies high levels of scientific uncertainty, given the need to examine radioactive releases 
to the biosphere over geological time.  In contrast, the SI case study involved relatively 
undisputed evidence about harm, but uncertainty around the optimal policy intervention 
required to manage risk.  The AI case study was concerned with an emergency response 
where the evidence being brokered was for emergency planning purposes in anticipation of 
relatively ‘novel’ risks.  For each case study, peer reviewed and grey literature was used to 
inform the directional flow of evidence and individual decision accountabilities.  The 
decision route for each case study was drafted using the structures in Oxera (2000), mapping 
the flow of evidence and noting the role played by various actors. 
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Table 1.  Six candidate case studies (shaded ones selected) with decision attributes 
 
N
ovelty 
S
cientific uncertainty 
B
ureaucratic structure 
E
nvironm
ental planning context 
P
olicy developm
ent 
O
perational/tactical regulation 
Flexibility of decision fram
ew
ork 
P
ublic dread 
E
m
ergency response 
G
eographically disperse 
1. Risk associated with the disposal of infected animal carcasses (AI) X   X     X  
2. Risk associated with the dietary salt intake (SI)     X  X   X 
3. Risk associated with nuclear waste disposal (NW)  X X   X  X   
4. Risk associated with an outbreak of blue-tongue disease X X    X   X  
5. Risk associated with seasonal flooding    X     X X 
6. Risk associated with the disposal of hazardous waste to landfill   X X   X     
 
2.3  In-depth interviews 
Semi-structured interviews (n=3) were then conducted with experts for each case study 
to validate the decision routes above.  Experts’ feedback improved early drafts and validated 
the formal exchange of evidence between provider and recipient agents (Figure 1).  During 
the exploratory interviews, it became clear the sufficiency of evidence was, in part, 
determined by how it was characterised by six factors.  Accordingly, the experts were asked 
to break decisions down into constituent phases on a timeline, and rate the extent to which the 
evidence could be characterised as being qualitative, quantitative, political, social, technical 
and costly.  Information was used to construct the subsequent two-agent model. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1.  Example decision route for the disposal of avian influenza (AI) infected carcasses, 
having validated the flow and exchange of evidence between ‘provider’ and ‘recipient’.  
Ultimate decision-maker is shown as Secretary of State (SoS; Davies, 2010), where TSE, 
SEAC and DoH refers to ‘Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy’, ‘Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee’ and Department of Health respectively. 
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2.4  Representing lines of evidence 
The evidence used to test a hypothesis about the significance of a risk and how it 
should be managed is rarely uniform in direction, strength or weight (see Linkov et al., 2009).  
Evidence is frequently nested, in that evidence supporting a high-level ‘parent’ hypothesis is 
often contingent on lower level ‘child’ hypotheses with their associated lines of evidence.  To 
represent this structure, we employed the TESLA™ software (http://www.quintessa-
online.com/TESLA/; Benbow et al., 2006; Quintessa, 2008).  TESLA adopts evidence 
support logic and interval probability theory to represent how lines of evidence inform a 
group decision; say, on the risks of radioactive release from a waste repository over time 
(Figure 2).  TESLA disaggregates a decision into a hierarchy of parent and child hypotheses, 
for which an expert group - reflecting on how sufficient and necessary a child hypothesis is 
for answering a corresponding parent - determines the influence the available evidence has.  
In this way, ‘degrees of belief’ that support (+) or refute (-) a parent hypothesis are 
constructed, with uncommitted belief also being captured (Figure 2), the sum of these 
weights equating to 1 (100% belief). 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Figure 2.  TESLA representation of parent and child hypotheses for radioactive waste 
disposal (adapted from Quintessa, 2008).  
 
Adapting TESLA, we assumed each hypothesis has an agent – a recipient with 
responsibility for interrogating the evidence submitted to them.  Regulatory staff in different 
positions of authority have variable degrees of power to determine the sufficiency and 
adequacy of evidence submitted in support of a belief – say about the operational safety of an 
industrial facility. 
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2.5 A deterministic two-agent model incorporating receptivity 
A two-agent model to simulate the understanding above was developed using North 
and Macal (2007).  Receptivity facilitates knowledge sharing (Deng, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; 
2009) and the opposite of receptivity is resistance (Kearney, 2007).  Agent receptivity was 
represented through the assignment of weights (see Appendix for conditional logic) for 
personality and power influences (Davies et al., 2010), and for the receipt, processing and 
passing-on of evidence, with an overall receptivity weight derived.  An interface allowed the 
user to vary the conditions for the recipient’s receptivity for a set of scenarios (see 
Supplementary Information Table A1 and Figure A1).  Spread sheet layers, represented in 
Figure 3, drew on values set through the interface and performed 10 000 runs for recipients’ 
receptivity under selected scenarios.  The mean receptivity (with standard deviation) was 
estimated using three steps: 
1. Intensity ranges were assigned to factors (personality and power, and the level of decision 
uncertainty) that influenced recipient receptivity. 
2. The model selected values at random within these ranges using the random number 
generator within MS Excel®. 
3. Values (0-1) were propagated through the receptivity model to generate a weight for the 
receipt, processing and passing-on stages, before being averaged to generate an overall 
recipient receptivity. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
Figure 3.  Logical flow of the deterministic two-agent model. 
 
Levels of intensity were selected for agents’ personality traits.  The ‘big five’ traits 
(openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism), said to represent 
the most stable characteristics of individuals over time were employed, with ‘neuroticism’ 
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replaced by ‘emotional stability’ (the reverse of ‘neuroticism’) allowing a scoring of traits 
uniform in direction (Johnson, 1999; Costa and McCrae, 1992).  Scholars scoring personality 
traits do so on a scale from 0 to 100, agreeing that scores 55 or higher are considered to 
exhibit a strong dimension in that trait.  Those that score 45 or below are considered to 
exhibit the opposite effect.  Trait scores between 45 and 55 fall within the standard deviation 
of the big five personality test (Barrick et al., 1998; Digman, 1990; Ghasem-Aghee and Ören, 
2007;  Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999).  Trait scores were assigned for recipient and provider, 
representing agent’s motivation to process information systematically and to share this 
knowledge (Davies et al., 2010; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999).  Here, the conventional 
degrees of intensity (low, medium and high) were refined to six levels to investigate the 
influence of decision uncertainty (Table 2a,b).  This allowed the user to better represent the 
case studies by low to high levels of decision uncertainty. 
 
Table 2(a,b) Levels of intensity characterising (a) decision uncertainty; and (b) personality 
trait, where “Random” refers to the option to select values using a random number generator. 
(a) Levels of intensity used to characterise decision uncertainty. 
Very high (VH) 0.83 to 0.99 
High (H) 0.66 to 0.82 
High medium (HM) 0.50 to 0.66 
Low medium (LM) 0.33 to 0.50 
Low (L) 0.17 to 0.33 
Very low (VL) 0 to 0.16 
Random 0 to 0.99 
 
(b) Levels of intensity used to characterise each personality trait 
Very high (VH) 0.775 to 1 
High (H) 0.55 to 0.775 
High medium (HM) 0.50 to 0.55 
Low medium (LM) 0.45 to 0.50 
Low (L) 0.225 to 0.45 
Very low (VL) 0 to 0.225 
Random 0 to 1 
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2.6 A dynamic two-agent model incorporating personality and power 
Finally, we attempted a dynamic version of the model to incorporate a two-way 
interaction (dialogue) between provider and recipient and explore the confidence that might 
be instilled in recipients about the adequacy of evidence submitted to them.  In interviews, 
experts explained how recipients and providers negotiate and reach consensus about the 
adequacy of evidence.  We were interested whether the model could represent this process.  
Agent receptivity in the dynamic model was represented using the logic set out in the 
deterministic model, although three rather than six levels of intensity were used.  Legitimate 
power and referent power were also incorporated.  Legitimate power reflects the limited 
period recipients are permitted to engage with providers.  The model assumed a consultation 
consisted of one submission of evidence per day.  The number of days’ consultation was set 
by the value of the recipient’s legitimate power, which decreased by a value of ‘1’ with each 
simulation run.  Referent power was reflected by including this within agent’s assessment of 
receptivity.  An agent’s referent power was assessed by taking the average of the agent’s 
agreeableness and emotional stability.   
Using suitable combinations of the ‘big five’ personality traits above, agents were 
assigned one of four personalities (‘negotiator’, ‘aggressor’, ‘submissive’ and ‘avoider’; 
Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2008; 2009; Santos et al., 2010).  To achieve this, each of the big 
five personality traits, for each agent, was assigned a low, medium or high value (0 – 0.45, 
0.45 – 0.55 and 0.55 – 1 respectively).  Because the literature does not specify for certain the 
intensity for the four personality sets, a level of intensity was selected from a uniform 
distribution and maintained within this band for subsequent simulations, as illustrated in 
Table 3 for the “Agent environment” spread sheet. 
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Table 3.  Showing relative levels of intensity (low, medium and high) assigned to each 
personality, where “Random” refers to the option to select a value at random between 0 and 1 
using the MS Excel® random number generator. 
Personality Big five personality traits 
Openness Conscientiousness Extroversion Agreeableness Emotional 
stability 
Negotiator Random Medium High Medium Medium 
Aggressor Random High High Medium Medium 
Submissive Random Low Low Medium Medium 
Avoider Random Low Low Random Low 
 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) code was used to update an “Agent 
environment” spread sheet according to changes in the agents’ personal information in the 
model (Figure 4) and contextual issues derived from a “Scenario” spread sheet; before 
receptivity was estimated and stored in a “Data log” spread sheet.  For every run, a new 
random value was generated within the same band for each personality trait.  Updating the 
recipient’s and provider’s personal information (Figure 4) reflected the variance in the 
expression of personality across different decision contexts (Costa and McCrae, 1992).  
Overall receptivity was estimated using an average of receptivity across each of the three 
stages – the receiving, processing and passing-on stage of evidence brokering. 
 [FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Figure 4. Sequence of events for updating agents’ receptivity according to changes in 
personal information. 
 
The model dynamics incorporated four stages simulating the transaction of evidence 
from provider to recipient (Figure 5).  The extent to which a transaction is successful 
depended on how the evidence was characterised by the parties (qualitative, quantitative, 
political, social, technical and costly aspects).  If the recipient and provider expectations 
match, the brokering is successful and the recipient’s confidence in the ‘trade’ builds. 
[INSERT FIGURE 5] 
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Figure 5. Logic for  the confidence building exercise with questions asked by the agent-based 
model sequentially in a clockwise order. 
 
The provider submitted evidence in support of their belief, and the recipient evaluated the 
adequacy of the evidence, their confidence in it and thereby the sufficiency of the provider’s 
belief (Figure 5, stage 1).  Where these matched, the recipient was considered to have 100% 
confidence in the trade.  Where there was a mismatch (Figure 5, stage 2), these weights were 
multiplied against the recipient’s weights and the ratio between new and the initial sum of 
recipients weights subtracted from the value of 1 (100%) and multiplied by one hundred to 
represent recipients increased confidence in the adequacy of evidence.  If the recipient had 
legitimate power and the evidence failed to instil the recipient with 100% confidence, the 
recipient would engage in consultation with the provider.  The evidence was passed back to 
the provider; a corollary of a request for additional information or further work from a 
regulatee (Figure 5, stage 3).  Taking the average of the recipient’s receptivity and the 
provider’s receptivity indicated how likely the provider would be to understand the 
expectations of the recipient (Figure 5, stage 4).  If this value fell between 0.15 & 0.38, 0.38 
& 0.57 or 0.57 & 0.92 then the provider was considered to have a low, medium or high 
chance (respectively) of understanding how the recipient’s expectations.  This was expressed 
in the model by generating a random value for each aspect of the evidence between 0 & 1, 
0.33 & 1 or 0.66 & 1 respectively; allowing the provider a greater chance of weighting the 
evidence adequately.  This random value was generated within the specified range for each 
type of evidence characterising the new submission.  These were then multiplied against the 
remaining weights that the recipient had assigned to each types of evidence before 
recalculating recipients confidence.  This represented the extent to which a new submission 
would meet the recipient’s expectations.  If the recipient had legitimate power and the new 
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submission of evidence failed to instil 100% confidence, the recipient would engage in 
further consultation with the provider (Figure 5, go around the loop again) until they lacked 
legitimate power to do so or were 100% confident in the adequacy of the submitted evidence.  
This process was captured in a series of subroutines called up in a logical order (see 
Supplementary Information Figure, A2&3, Table A2).  An iteration of evidence between 
recipient and provider was allowed to continue until a ‘Do While/Loop’ function in VBA 
determined the number of simulations were complete (representing the extent of the 
recipient’s legitimate power).   
 
3.  Results 
We present three sets of results: (i) recipient agents’ receptivity as represented in the 
deterministic model; (ii) how agent personality differs in its predisposition toward 
‘propensity to trust’, ‘trustworthiness’, ‘motivation to process evidence’ and ‘motivation to 
share knowledge’ which are used to represent agent receptivity; (iii) demonstrating how 
recipient and provider agents with greatest and least capacity to build receptivity also express 
greatest and least capacity to build confidence. 
 
3.1  Recipient receptivity to evidence submitted 
Figure 6 illustrates how the recipient and provider have either a positive or negative 
impact on the recipient’s receptivity to a provider’s belief, as supported by the evidence they 
submit.  Each bar represents a mean of 10,000 recipient receptivity values, for 13 scenarios 
across the three case studies.  Moving from left to the right (Figure 6), the first bar represents 
the control where intensity levels were randomly set between 0 and 1.  Each subsequent 
cluster of four bars represents the low, medium and high levels of decision uncertainty and 
legitimate power for the salt intake (SI), carcase disposal (AI) and radioactive waste (RW) 
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case studies, in turn.  Bars within each cluster represent the recipient’s receptivity under the 
following conditions: 
•  (dotted bar) both recipient and provider agents are set to have a negative impact on 
recipient’s receptivity (R- & P-); 
• (hashed bar) both recipient and provider agents are set to have a positive impact on 
recipient’s receptivity (R+ & P+); 
• (net) recipient and provider agent are set to have a negative and positive impact on 
recipient’s receptivity, respectively (R+ & P-); and 
• (vertical stripe) recipient and provider agents are set to have a positive and negative 
impact on recipient’s respectively (R+ & P-). 
[INSERT FIGURE 6] 
 
Figure 6. Mean recipient’s receptivity for 13 scenarios, with error bars representing standard 
deviation. 
 
The error bars represent standard deviation and show the difference between the mean 
receptivity when values for each parameter were selected at random between 0 and 1 (the 
control) and the mean receptivity in the situation where both the recipient and the provider 
was predisposed toward imbuing the recipient with receptivity (the second bar in each 
cluster).  In all clusters, the recipient is seen to have the greatest impact on recipient 
receptivity, by comparing the third and fourth bar in each cluster. Also, the influence agents 
have on recipient receptivity increases with the presence of decision uncertainty, reflecting 
the impact of agent’s motivation to process and share knowledge.  
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3.2  The dynamic model – the role of personality 
Four personality sets were investigated; the ‘negotiator’, ‘aggressor’, ‘submissive’ 
and ‘avoider’.  These gave a broad indication of the model’s capacity to simulate agent 
receptivity.  The ‘avoider’ personality was split into avoider-low and avoider-high referring 
to high and low measures of agreeableness respectively, testing the model’s capability to 
represent an agents’ propensity to trust and trustworthiness.  Figure 7a-c illustrates that the 
avoider-low personality, with a low measure of agreeableness, produced the least propensity 
to trust and trustworthiness.   
[INSERT FIGURE 7(a-c)] 
Figure 7.  Showing relative measures of (a) propensity to trust, (b) trustworthiness and (c) 
referent power for each of the four personalities in the two agent model.  Where ‘avoider-
high’ and ‘avoider-low’ personality is being calculated with high and low measures of 
agreeableness and emotional stability respectively.  
 
Figure 8 illustrates the frequency of weights being generated over 10,000 runs under 
the best and worst circumstances for agents motivated to process and share knowledge.  
Agents’ motivation to process knowledge was dependent on their orientation toward 
uncertainty (Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999).  Agents with high levels of openness are 
uncertainty-motivated.  Agents low in openness were said to be certainty-orientated.  This 
meant that when uncertainty and openness were either both high or both low, they were 
motivated to process knowledge.  An agent’s motivation to share knowledge, however, was 
dependent on how motivated agents were to process the evidence.  If either agent was highly 
motivated to process the evidence (or both were unmotivated), this resulted in agents being 
poorly motivated to share knowledge.  If agents were unequally motivated to process the 
evidence they were more motivated to share knowledge (Cheng, unpublished). 
[INSERT FIGURE 8] 
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Figure 8.  Boxplots showing low (1), medium (2) and high (3) values generated for 
motivation to process evidence and motivation to share knowledge. 
 
These results reflect the literature on the propensity to trust, trustworthiness and 
referent power.  Table 4 shows that the aggressor and the avoider-low personality generated 
greatest and least propensity to trust, trustworthiness and referent power respectively,  
 
Table 4. Personalities that generate the ‘most’ and ‘least’ propensity to trust, trustworthiness 
and referent power. 
 Personality 
Negotiator Aggressor Submissive Avoider-low 
Propensity to trust ‘Most’ √ √   ‘Least’    √ 
Trustworthiness ‘Most’  √   ‘Least’    √ 
Referent power ‘Most’ √ √ √  ‘Least’    √ 
 
Figure 9 shows the different rates at which confidence was gained as recipients and 
providers engaged in dialogue under the best (top schematics; a) and worst (bottom 
schematics; b) case scenarios.  At the onset of dialogue, the level of recipient’s confidence 
varies, just as the rate at which confidence is attained varied for each submission.  Even with 
this element of uncertainty, the model is able to distinguish between the best and worst case 
scenario over 10 submissions of evidence (where the recipient must gain 100% confidence in 
the adequacy of supporting evidence before fully accepting the sufficiency of the providers 
belief, and where recipients have unlimited legitimate power).  The distinction between 
agents with personalities predisposed to being receptive and imbuing others with receptivity 
(and those that are not) is seen to affect the rate of the confidence building by: the rate at 
which the recipient’s confidence builds over time, resulting in 10 submissions being 
completed in 71 rather than 96 days (i.e. 26% more efficient). 
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[INSERT FIGURE 9] 
Figure 9 (a,b).  Confidence gained over multiple submissions of evidence (a) where both 
recipient and provider agents’ personalities are predisposed to being receptive; and (b) where 
both are not predisposed to being receptive. 
 
4. Discussion 
The nature of regulation is under review as western Governments move towards a 
more facilitative, decentralised approach (Gunningham, 2009; Pollard et al., 2009).  This 
raises issues about the tone of regulatory exchange, the quality of evidence that supports 
environmental risk decisions and the skill sets required of regulatory staff.  For the regulated, 
the same applies – those seeking earned recognition by going beyond compliance (Taylor et 
al., 2012; 2013) need a new style of exchange.  So how evidence is brokered, by whom, and 
under what conditions matters for beneficial regulatory, business and environmental 
outcomes.  Using conventional approaches to ethnographic research with the intent of 
observing regulator-regulatee interactions up close is rarely practical.  Agent-based 
approaches may have merit in revealing the influences at work when evidence to support 
decisions is provided to regulators, discussed and its suitability for informing decisions 
considered. 
Classically, agent-based models focus on how complex dynamics and outcomes rely 
on the network of interactions between agents.  They have been built using techniques such 
as discrete event simulation and object orientated programming (Brailsford and Schnidt, 
2003) that reproduce the critical features of complex systems using component level rules.  
‘Behavioural signatures’ can be allocated to individual agents (Epstein, 2006; North and 
Macal, 2007) offering a social richness and behavioural realism (Mischel, 1999; Mischel and 
Shoda,, 1995; Shoda, 1999; 2002) difficult to capture in conventional decision analytics.  Our 
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two-agent model is rudimentary, but suggests how transactions between parties might 
influence a recipient’s receptivity towards the evidence that subsequently informs a decision 
on risk.  The two-agent model is shown capable, at least in principle, of exploring a 
recipient’s tendency to trust, and the influence this has on their receptivity and the rate at 
which confidence can be gained.  
To demonstrate the breadth of behaviour captured within the deterministic model, the 
most optimistic and pessimistic scenarios were simulated by making changes in system 
parameters; revealing the influence underlying features had on agent receptivity.  As a form 
of validation, this was carried out for a number of scenarios, illustrating how the model 
reflects aspects of environmental permitting (NW), policy development (SI) and emergency 
planning decisions (AI).  Recipient receptivity was highest for the former, which was 
expected given the greater level of uncertainty.  Agents with high openness to experience 
providing evidence (characterised by high uncertainty) to agents with low openness to 
experience had high and low motivation to process information, respectively, and were highly 
motivated to share knowledge (Cheng, unpublished; Hodson and Sorrentino, 1999; 
Sorrentino et al., 1992).  It is also seen that recipient receptivity had a greater influence than 
provider receptivity (Figure 6), suggesting the hierarchical model of receptivity is able to 
represent some of the trends explained to us by experts. 
Model dynamics were developed by assigning agents specific personalities and 
drawing parallels between the brokering of evidence and of commodities on a financial 
market.  Agents wishing to exchange a commodity (here, confidence) must determine 
whether bids for the commodity are acceptable (i.e. whether provider and recipient 
expectations about the weight of evidence relevant to the decision are matched).  Eventually, 
when the buyer (provider) makes an acceptable bid (a submission of adequately weighted 
evidence), the seller (recipient) exchanges the commodity for a specified currency (here, 
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confidence translating into units of sufficiency about the evidence submitted to them).  
Accounting for the provider’s receptivity is an important extension of the deterministic two 
agent model.  Experts in the interviews explained how inexperienced regulatees (providers) 
may miss opportunities, during regulatory exchange, to instil recipient regulators with 
confidence by failing to communicate the weight of evidence supporting a risk decision – 
instead, evidence was presented in binary terms.  Our model interpreted the provider’s 
receptivity as the extent to which the agent would ‘grasp what was being asked of them’ 
through the regulatory exchange (Figure 9).  Similarly, Gratch et al (2009) shows how 
recipients engaging in intelligible conversation have a better chance of imparting knowledge.  
This understanding of recipient and provider receptivity was employed in our model to 
determine the likelihood that (1) recipients would openly divulge how they wanted the 
evidence to be weighted; and (2) that the provider would comprehend this. 
By giving agents sets of personality characteristics we showed that overall, the 
aggressor and the avoider personality had the greatest and least potential to influence agent 
receptivity.  The ‘avoider’ personality set built confidence at a slower rate than the 
‘aggressor’; the latter suggesting the recipient personality set was less open to divulging what 
types of evidence they require, and for the provider suggesting a personality set less attentive 
to what was being asked of them.  The pessimistic scenario, represented an agent that would 
not seek out engagement with a provider, compared to the optimistic scenario representing an 
agent that would.  In Figure 9a&b this is shown to affect the rate of confidence building.  
Whilst this succeeds in demonstrating the extremes of the dynamic model, we are not 
suggesting the ‘aggressor’ personality set is the ideal for all recipient transactions. 
In the dynamic model the rate at which the regulator’s confidence increased with time 
influenced confidence building. Experts told us that the rate of confidence building also 
varied for the three case studies.  In the radioactive waste case, confidence would build at a 
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slower rate because of the greater level of uncertainty characterising the decision.  In our 
model this was mostly reflected by the influence of an agent’s motivation to process and 
share knowledge between the pessimistic and the optimistic scenarios. 
Having demonstrated a ‘proof of concept’ two-agent model, we believe it possible to 
develop a fully-fledged multi-agent system for the full set of interactions in Figure 1, say.  
This would allow us to fully map the decision processes that have been validated by the 
experts and create ‘behavioural signatures’ to distinguish between agents in different 
positions within each decision hierarchy (see Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Shoda, 1995; 
Shoda, 1999; Shoda et al., 2002).  Moreover, we have not fully explored the use of 
dependency in TESLA™.   By applying the concept of dependency during the exchange of 
evidence, we might allow agents to evaluate new evidence only, making the transaction more 
realistic. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates it is possible to construct a two-agent model to reflect 
authentic regulatory situations, personality influences and power structures on information 
flows.  Existing risk frameworks pay little homage to the reality that decisions are made by 
people, and as such, frameworks can fail to account for the influence power and personality 
may have on the brokering of evidence that supports decisions about risk (Powell, 1999).  
Here, an exploratory research tool capable of mapping the logic of how evidence is brokered, 
and confidence built, was developed.  Simulation of personalities sets generating the greatest 
and least agent receptivity (and thereby for building confidence) in this model were found to 
be the ‘aggressor’ and ‘avoider’ personality.  Comparing the most optimistic and pessimistic 
scenario the former was able to complete 10 successful submissions in 71 days (compared 
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with 96 days). 
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Appendix 
Equations (1) and (2) were used to calculate agent receptivity.  The values assigned to the 
personality traits (i.e. openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, emotional 
stability) depended in the personality assigned to the agent. 
(1) R.Receptivity = (R.PtT + R.MtP + P.Tw + P.RP)/3 
(2) P.Receptivity = (R.Tw + R.RP + P.PtT + P.MtP + R.Mts)/4 
Where: 
 
R.PtT = (RE+ RA+ RES)/3 
 
R.Tw = (RC+RA)/2 
 
P.PtT = (PE+PA+PES)/3 
 
P.Tw = (PC+PA)/2 
 
P.RP = (PA+PES)/2 
 
R.RP = (RA+RES)/2 
 
 
  0.6 ≤ X ≤ 0.99 If (RO > 0.55 and Unc > 0.6) or ( RO < 0.45 and Unc < 0.29) 
 
R.MtP =  0 ≤ X ≤ 0.29 If (RO > 0.55 and Unc < 0.29) or (RO < 0.45 and Unc > 0.6) 
 
  0.3 ≤ X ≤ 0.59  
    
  Where X 𝜖 ℝ 
 
 
  0.6 ≤ X ≤ 0.99 If (PO > 0.55 and Unc > 0.6) or ( PO < 0.45 and Unc < 0.29) 
 
P.MtP =  0 ≤ X ≤ 0.29 If (PO > 0.55 and Unc < 0.29) or (PO < 0.45 and Unc > 0.6) 
 
  0.3 ≤ X ≤ 0.59  
    
  Where X 𝜖 ℝ 
 
 
  0.6 ≤ X ≤ 0.99 If (R.MtP < 0.29 and P.MtP > 0.6) or (R.MtP > 0.6 and P.MtP < 0.29) 
 
R.MtS =  0 ≤ X ≤ 0.29 If (R.MtP < 0.29 and P.MtP < 0.29) or (R.MtP > 0.6 and P.MtP > 0.6) 
 
  0.3 ≤ X ≤ 0.59  
    
  Where X 𝜖 ℝ 
 
Where: 
R.PtT = Recipient’s propensity to trust  
R.MtP = Recipient’s motivation to process knowledge  
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P.Tw = Propensity to trust 
R.Tw  = Recipients trustworthiness 
P.PtT = Providers propensity to trust 
P.MtP = Providers motivation to process knowledge 
R.Mts = Recipients motivation to share knowledge 
RE = Recipients extroversion 
RA = Recipients agreeableness 
RES = Recipients emotional stability 
R.Tw = Recipients trustworthiness 
RC = Recipients conscientiousness 
RA = Recipients agreeableness 
P.PtT = Providers propensity to trust 
PE = Providers extroversion 
PA = Providers agreeableness 
PES = Providers emotional stability 
P.Tw = Providers trustworthiness 
PC = Providers conscientiousness 
PA = Providers agreeableness 
RO = Recipients openness 
PO = Providers openness  
Unc = Decision uncertainty   
P.RP = Providers referent power 
R.RP = Recipients referent power 
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List of Table captions 
 
Table 1.  Six candidate case studies (shaded ones selected) with decision attributes 
 
Table 2(a,b) Levels of intensity characterising (a) decision uncertainty; and (b) personality 
trait, where “Random” refers to the option to select values using a random number generator. 
 
Table 3.  Showing relative levels of intensity (low, medium and high) assigned to each 
personality, where “Random” refers to the option to select a value at random between 0 and 1 
using the MS Excel® random number generator. 
 
Table 4. Personalities that generate the ‘most’ and ‘least’ propensity to trust, trustworthiness 
and referent power. 
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Figure 1.  Example decision route for the disposal of avian influenza (AI) infected carcasses, 
having validated the flow and exchange of evidence between ‘provider’ and ‘recipient’.  
Ultimate decision-maker is shown as Secretary of State (SoS; Davies, 2010), where TSE, 
SEAC and DoH refers to ‘Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy’, ‘Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee’ and Department of Health respectively. 
 
Figure 2.  TESLA representation of parent and child hypotheses for radioactive waste 
disposal (adapted from Quintessa, 2008).  
 
Figure 3.  Logical flow of the deterministic two-agent model. 
 
Figure 4. Sequence of events for updating agents’ receptivity according to changes in 
personal information. 
Figure 5. Logic for  the confidence building exercise with questions asked by the agent-based 
model sequentially in a clockwise order. 
 
Figure 6. Mean recipient’s receptivity for 13 scenarios, with error bars representing standard 
deviation. 
 
Figure 7.  Showing relative measures of (a) propensity to trust, (b) trustworthiness and (c) 
referent power for each of the four personalities in the two agent model.  Where ‘avoider-
high’ and ‘avoider-low’ personality is being calculated with high and low measures of 
agreeableness and emotional stability respectively.  
 
Figure 8.  Boxplots showing low (1), medium (2) and high (3) values generated for 
motivation to process evidence and motivation to share knowledge. 
 
Figure 9 (a,b).  Confidence gained over multiple submissions of evidence (a) where both 
recipient and provider agents’ personalities are predisposed to being receptive; and (b) where 
both are not predisposed to being receptive. 
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Figure 1.  Example decision route for the disposal of avian influenza (AI) infected 
carcasses, having validated the flow and exchange of evidence between ‘provider’ and 
‘recipient’.  Ultimate decision-maker is shown as Secretary of State (SoS; Davies, 
2010), where TSE, SEAC and DoH refers to ‘Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathy’, ‘Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee’ and Department 
of Health respectively. 
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referent power for each of the four personalities in the two agent model.  Where ‘avoider-high’ 
and ‘avoider-low’ personality is being calculated with high and low measures of agreeableness 
and emotional stability respectively.  
Figure 8.  Boxplots showing low (1), medium (2) and high 
(3) values generated for motivation to process evidence and 
motivation to share knowledge. 
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Figure 9 (a,b).  Confidence gained over multiple submissions of 
evidence (a) where both recipient and provider agents’ 
personalities are predisposed to being receptive; and (b) where 
both are not predisposed to being receptive. 
